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Transnational corporations and the 
political economy of export promotion: 
the case of the Mexican 
automobile industry 
Douglas Bennett and Kenneth E. Sharpe 
Introduction 
Two World Wars, a depression, and chronic balance of payments deficits 
impelled most of Latin America to adopt an import substitution strategy 
towards industrialization well before it became development orthodoxy. A 
mere two decades after Raul Prebisch's classic statement of the case for im-
port substitution, 1 however, comparative advantage-based export-oriented 
strategies were once again coming into vogue, with the new wrinkle that 
manufactured exports rather than primary product exports were being en-
couraged. 2 
The new "outward-looking" export orthodoxy details a full bill of 
particulars against import substitution. Such an industrialization strategy, it is 
argued, tends to exhaust itself as the "easy opportunities" of domestic 
Funding from the following foundations made possible the larger research project of which this 
paper is a part: The Tinker Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, the Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, and the Doherty Foundation. We are particularly indebted to 
Linda Lim for comments and criticism on an earlier draft. 
1 Raul Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems 
(New York: United Nations, 1950). 
2 The most thorough general statement in the argument is in Ian Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and 
Maurice Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries; A Comparative Study 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970). See also, Bela Balassa, "Growth Strategies in 
Semi-Industrial Countries," Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (1970): 24-42; and Daniel M. 
Schydlowsky, "Latin American Trade Policies in the 1970s: A Prospective Appraisal," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 86 (1972): 263-289. 
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178 International Organization 
manufacture are used up. 3 Through high tariffs, a captive market, and an 
over-valued exchange rate, import-substitution tends to nurture an inefficient 
manufacturing sector, particularly when and insofar as industrialization is 
pushed beyond the easy opportunities. Far from curing balance of payments 
problems, the indictment continues, the inward-looking import substitution 
strategy has only succeeded in changing the composition of the import bill 
from consumer to producer goods. And because this shift has made imports 
more difficult to curtail in the short run without risking a serious recession, it 
is argued that import substitution has tended to strengthen the links of 
dependency. 4 
To be sure, many of the arguments that have been lodged against import 
substitution policy pertain not to the policy as such but rather to the manner in 
which it has been carried out. Import substitution need not, as Bela Balassa 
seems to contend, ignore "the economic cost of policy alternatives," apply 
protective measures "haphazardly," "neglect ... the interrelationships of 
individual industries," nor retain protective measures in an industry "ad 
infinitum," well beyond its infant industry stage. 5 In truth, the boosting of 
export promotion as an alternative development strategy has to some extent 
relied on an unfair comparison of import substitution as it has been carried 
out, full of the imperfections and irrationalities of actual policy, with an 
idealized depiction of export promotion as it might be pursued. 
The burden of this article will be to anticipate problems with the export 
promotion strategy in sectors dominated by transnational corporations, 
problems that are not evident in the idealized portrait of export promotion 
that has been drawn by neo-classical economics, a portrait that exhibits 
considerable abstraction from real world governments, buyers, sellers, and 
markets. The case for export promotion often supposes that the exports that 
are to be developed are ones from labor-intensive sectors, which are less often 
dominated by TNCs. Planners in developing countries, however, frequently 
look to promote exports from the high-technology, capital-intensive sectors in 
which TNCs predominate, precisely because of the export capability that such 
corporations are held to possess. The presence of TNCs in a manufacturing 
sector may seriously alter the possibilities and conditions of success of an 
export promotion strategy, however. In the discussion that follows, specific 
reference will be made to the case of the automobile industry in Mexico. 
Briefly stated, the argument on behalf of the export promotion strategy 
contends that manufactured exports are necessary to permit continued 
economic growth (the opportunities of import substitution having been 
exhausted), to make use of excess manufacturing capacity (that has inef-
3 For a spirited rebuttal of the exhaustion argument, see Albert 0. Hirschman, "The Political 
Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin America," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 82 (1968): 1-32. 
• Daniel Schydlowsky, Joe. cit.: 270-271. 
• Bela Balassa, Joe. cit.: 28-37. 
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The case of the Mexican automobile industry 179 
ficiently been brought into existence by import substitution), to create jobs, 
and to cure problems with the balance of payments. The overvalued exchange 
rates and artificially high input prices that accompany import substitution 
strategies discourage such manufactured exports, however, and so the policy 
recommendation that follows from this analysis counsels the dismantling of 
protective machinery, an end to over-valued exchange rates, and tax subsidies 
and other measures to induce exports where a comparative advantage may be 
expected. 
The literature that has urged this strategy of export promotion (or "ex-
port substitution" since it seeks to substitute manufactured exports for more 
traditional primary product exports) has certain recurrent blindspots. 
1) Lack of attention to ownership and structural characteristics of 
specific sectors. Much of the argument for export promotion has been con-
cerned with the orientation of the whole economy (import substitution vs. 
export promotion) and with the policy tools that serve to set that orientation-
exchange rate, tariff structure, and tax policy. The presumption, of course, is 
that manufactured exports will be promoted only in certain sectors. But which 
sectors? Here the discussion has tended to be concerned only with relative 
factor prices, overlooking ownership and structural characteristics of specific 
industries, both domestically and internationally, factors that may be of equal 
importance in promoting exports. 6 In order to hold out some hope for genuine 
economic growth, export promotion arguments must attend to dynamic, not 
static comparative advantage-to those sectors in which a comparative ad-
vantage may be developed. The development of such a comparative advantage 
requires more than just a facilitative government policy; it requires an en-
trepreneurial agent. Whether subsidiaries of TNCs can be counted on to play 
such an entrepreneurial role will depend on structural characteristics of the 
industry and on organizational characteristics of the transnational firms. 
2) Inattention to the demand for manufactured exports. In being 
predominantly concerned with relative factor prices in particular sectors, 
attention has been devoted almost exclusively to considerations of supply, 
particularly to competitiveness in price but also to competitiveness in quality. 
Surely these are important considerations; but, at best, price and qual-
ity-competitiveness are necessary and not sufficient conditions for manu-
factured exports. It is not sufficient to say as Schydlowsky does, that "com-
mercial channels must be activated;" 1 some attention must be paid to the 
conditions under which there will be a demand for manufactured exports from 
developing countries. He notes that the exchange rate structure of many Latin 
• For discussions of the Mexican case that focus exclusively on relative factor prices, see Saul 
Trejo Reyes, "El Sector Externo en la Economia Mexicana: Crecimiento Optimo y Politica de 
Exportaciones," El Trimestre Economico, 166 (1975): 399-427; and Robert W. Boatler, "Trade 
Theory Predictions and the Growth of Mexico's Manufactured Exports," Economic Development 
and Cultural Change 23 (1974-75): 491-506. 
1 Schydlowsky, Joe. cit.: 279. 
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American countries, in biasing against manufactured exports, tends to create 
an "inefficiency illusion" of Latin American industry. 8 But demand will not 
follow simply and automatically on devaluation, tariff reform, and a public 
relations effort to dispel the illusion. 
Particularly important will be the role that the transnational firms play in 
the success of export promotion: they "accounted for almost two-thirds of the 
increase in exports of manufactured goods from Latin America in the decade 
between 1957 and 1966, " 9 and their importance has surely not waned in the 
decade since. Transnational corporations may pose obstacles as well as 
provide access to export markets. It is not the legal restrictions that a parent 
may place on its subsidiaries' exports that are the major concern here (which in 
any event are increasingly less in evidence as a result of prohibitive legislation 
in the host countries), but rather the trade consequences of the transnational 
firm's global strategy. The role of intracompany transfers in hindering or 
developing manufactured exports may, for example, be an important con-
sideration. More thus needs to be known about the economic circumstances 
and the government policies under which TNCs will export from developing 
countries. 
3) Inattention to problems of dependency. The export-promotion 
oriented critique of import substitution strategies notes the strengthening of 
bonds of dependency as import substitution shifts the composition of im-
ports toward producer goods but is strangely silent on the consequences for 
dependency of an export promotion strategy. Since such a strategy means a 
generally greater integration into the world capitalist economy, and often an 
increased role for transnational corporations, there are dependence con-
siderations that warrant exploration here. This raises another potential 
problem. 
4) Inattention to the problems of implementation and enforcement. It is 
the rare economist who considers the political preconditions for shifting 
development strategies or the support and the sanctions necessary to continue 
implementing them. 10 Again transnational corporations raise troubling 
concerns. If these foreign firms originally came to the host country because of 
its import substitution program, might the government not find it difficult to 
induce the TNCs to behave in accord with an export-promotion strategy 
because of these firms' global strategies? If the government comes to depend 
on transnational corporations for its export-promotion strategy, to what 
degree will they gain control over the future direction of government policy. 
5) Lack of attention to distributional effects of policy. The dominant 
question in evaluating economic policy alternatives has usually been the 
question of aggregate growth, although at times it is challenged for centrality 
by the problem of the balance of payments. What have not been much in 
• Ibid.: 275-276. 
• Jose de Ia Torre, "Foreign Investment and Export Dependency," Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 23 (1974-75): 137-138. 
10 For a distinguished exception, see Albert 0. Hirschman, Joe. cit. 
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consideration are distributional matters: who will share in this growth, and 
who will benefit from these exports? These questions warrant more at-
tention.11 
In short, in being the preserve of economists, the export promotion 
argument has been inattentive to institutions, to distributional questions, and 
to political factors. A political economy perspective can cure these defects. 
In order to give careful attention to institutional and structural con-
siderations this paper focuses on one sector, the automobile industry in 
Mexico. It is a particularly interesting sector in which to study the potential 
strengths and weaknesses of shifting from an import substitution to an export 
promotion strategy. From having been (in the early 1960s) a key sector in 
government efforts at import substitution, the automobile sector has now 
come to be seen as an overprotected and inefficient industry, one that uses 
large amounts of foreign exchange but that could instead be a net generator of 
foreign exchange. Since 1969 the government has implemented a number of 
policies principally designed to induce automotive exports. While it may seem 
that the automobile industry is an unlikely one in which Mexico could have a 
comparative advantage, Robert Boatler has taken pains to demonstrate that 
"the indication from Mexico's export experience to date is that the greatest 
marginal comparative advantage of semi-industrialized countries will be 
found in the most completely modernized and generally capital-intensive 
industries." 12 The sort of policy that has been adopted is one that has allowed 
the firms considerable latitude with regard to the kinds of automobile products 
that are to be exported. Since automobile products (particularly auto parts) 
show considerable variation in terms of scale economies, capital intensity, etc., 
surely each firm could find some automotive products which could be 
profitably exported. Also, it should be noted, Brazil-a country with roughly 
similar characteristics-has shown a measure of success in developing 
automotive exports. 
The automobile industry in Mexico is an industry in which there is strong 
participation of transnational corporations but in which domestic private and 
state firms play a role as well. In Mexico, the automobile industry has been 
made something of a paradigmatic case; close attention to this sector should 
indicate considerations that will be important in other sectors and in other 
countries. 
The Mexican automobile industry 
Since the Second World War, the automobile industry in each of the 
major manufacturing countries has undergone a substantial process of con-
11 For one discussion of the merits of import substitution and export promotion on 
distributional grounds, see Rene Villarreal, El Desequilibrio Externo en la Industria/izaci6n de 
Mexico (1929-1975); Un Enfoque Estructuralista (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1976), 
pp. 90-103. 
12 Robert Boatler, Joe. cit.: 506. 
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centration, and this has been both cause and consequence of a marked in-
ternationalization of competition with the surviving firms-eight firms ac-
counted for 85 percent of world auto sales in 1973-invading each other's 
markets. 13 Increasingly since the mid-1950s, competition in the industry has 
been characterized by product differentiation, the provision of a wide range of 
vehicles by each firm, and annual model changes. Because of high scale 
economies in some phases of production (particularly exterior body stamp-
ings) and high fixed-capital costs, the firms have sought to expand the 
production volumes of their home country plants while contesting for new, 
developing markets. The larger Latin American countries (Brazil, Mexico, 
Argentina) have been particularly intense sites of competition. The trans-
national auto companies supplied these markets first through imports and 
later (scale economies being markedly lower in this phase) through local 
assembly of imported kits. In view of the technical and structural charac-
teristics of the industry, it would not have been rational for the firms to move 
of their own accord to local manufacture, but as a number of these countries, 
in pursuit of import substitution industrialization strategies, have introduced 
requirements of minimum local content, the firms have initiated local 
manufacture rather than surrender the market to competitors. 14 
An additional consideration that bears on the strategies of the automobile 
firms in locating production facilities concerns the large number of automobile 
parts that are manufactured by independent suppliers-a pattern that 
developed to handle special technical problems with some parts and to spread 
the substantial risk in automobile manufacture. 15 Because the design of new 
models requires close coordination with their parts suppliers, the automobile 
manufacturers have developed intimate relationships with the parts suppliers. 
They have encouraged the parts suppliers to open foreign subsidiaries in 
countries where local content requirements have been implemented, but this 
has not always been possible. 
Prior to 1962 the Mexican automobile industry was composed of about a 
dozen firms assembling automobiles from CKD (completely knocked down) 
kits and another twenty importing already-assembled vehicles. Three of the 
assemblers-Ford, G.M. and Fabricas AutoMex (producing Chrysler au-
tomobiles)-accounted for nearly three-quarters of the total. The L6pez 
Mateos government, guided by an import substitution orientation and con-
13 In 1973 the two leading companies, GM and Ford, accounted for over 40 percent of total 
world automobile sales, and the largest eight for about 85 percent. The largest eight, in order, were 
GM, Ford, Chrysler, Fiat, Volkswagen, Toyota, Nissan, and Renault. "New Strategies for a 
World Auto Market," Business Week 24 November 1973: 38. Six of these firms operate in Mexico 
with wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries (GM, Ford, Chrysler, Volkswagen, and Nissan) or with 
licensees (DINA-Renault); and only one Mexican firm is affiliated with a transnational firm not 
among these eight (VAMSA, a minority-owned subsidiary of American Motors). 
14 Rhys Owen Jenkins, Dependent Industrialization in Latin America; The Automotive Industry 
in Argentina, Chile and Mexico (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 20 ff. 
15 On the role of risk in creating this pattern, see Lawrence J. White, The Automobile Industry 
Since 1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
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The case of the Mexican automobile industry 
Table 1: Composition of the Mexican automotive industry 
Ownership 
by Percent 
Firm Foreign Domestic 
Chrysler de Mexico, S.A. 99.1 0.9 
Diesel Nacional S.A. 1 0 100 
(Mexican State) 
Ford Motor Co. S.A. 100 0 
General Motors de Mexico S.A. 100 0 
Nissan Mexicana 100 0 
Vehiculos Automotores 40 60 
Mexicana S.A. 2 (Mexican State) 
Volkswagen de Mexico 100 0 
1 Manufactures Renault automobiles under a license. 
2 Manufactures American Motors vehicles. 












cerned to take measures that would stimulate industrialization and create 
employment, decreed in 1962 that within two years automobiles sold in Mex-
ico would have to embody at least 60 percent local content including at least 
the motor and the power train. It decreed further that the firms could 
manufacture their own motors, but other parts to be counted for local content 
would have to be procured from independent domestic suppliers. As an im-
portant manufacturing sector, the automobile industry was born with this 
decree.1 6 
Eighteen firms made applications to be allowed to manufacture under the 
terms of the new regimen, and eventually ten of these were approved. Seven 
still continue to operate.17 (See Table 1.) Between 1962 and 1964 the success-
ful applicants made the investments necessary to commence manufacturing 
operations. In large measure, the burden of creating a parts supply industry 
fell on these firms in the "terminal industry" (the firms actually producing 
finished automobiles), most of which were subsidiaries of transnational 
corporations. 
A requirement of 60 percent local content meant that 40 percent of each 
automobile continued to be imported. As its sales volume grew steadily (see 
1• "Decreto que prohibe la importaci6n de motores para autom6viles y camiones, asi como de 
conjuntos mecanicos armados para su uso o ensamble, a partir del 10. de septiembre de 1964," 
Diario Oficial (25 August 1962). For a detailed account of how this decree came about, see 
Douglas Bennett and Kenneth Sharpe, "Agenda Setting and Bargaining Power in TWC-Host 
Government Conflicts: The Case of the Mexican Automobile Industry, Comparative Politics, 
forthcoming. 
11 The three firms that disappeared were Representaciones Delta, which planned to manufacture 
DKWs and perhaps Mercedes; Reo, which planned to produce Toyotas; and Fabrica Nacional de 
Automoviles (FANASA) which sold only 2000-3000 Borgwards before closing in 1970. Neither 
Representaciones Delta nor Reo produced any vehicles under the terms of the 1962 Decree. 
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Figure 1) through the 1960s, the industry's net balance of payments deficit 
grew steadily, thus contributing to an increasingly worrisome general balance 
of payments position (see Figure 2). By the late 1960s, the balance of payments 
problem had set the basic terms of choice in this sector; government policy 
makers have struggled with it ever since. Increasing the local content in each 
vehicle or developing exports to compensate for imports were seen as the two 
alternative solutions. Both solutions would serve to further spur in-
dustrialization. But the choice in this leading sector involved two wider 
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alternative growth strategies. If increased local content were adopted as the 
solution, the long-standing commitment to an import substitution route to 
industrialization would remain in force; if compensatory exports were 
adopted, a change of direction, at least a flirtation with a more outward 
looking, export-promoting strategy would be implied. 
The first response of government policy makers was to move toward 
export promotion. In 1969, the Diaz Ordaz government (1964-1970) required 
the terminal firms to compensate a steadily increasing percentage of their 
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imports with exports; this policy was solidified and extended by the Echeverria 
regime (I 970-76) in 1972. 18 Non-compliance with export requirements, 
however, led to problems. In 1976, the Echeverria government drafted a plan 
oriented toward higher local content rather than exports, but the policy was 
never promulgated. When the Lopez Portillo government took office in 
December 1976 it moved toward a compromise position: in its 1977 Decree, it 
again required the terminal firms to compensate imports with exports, but 
required a somewhat higher level of local content as well. 19 What was the 
rationale behind these government responses? What were the arguments made 
for the switch from import substitution to export promotion, and what 
problems led to a re-evaluation of policy? 
For reasons that square with the export-promotion critique of import 
substitution, a choice for more local content faced a number of objections. It 
was argued that the automobile industry was already producing in Mexico 
those parts that could be manufactured at costs close to those in more in-
dustrialized countries. If more local content were required, the parts that 
would now have to be domestically manufactured would be parts that could be 
manufactured only at relatively much higher costs. 20 An already inefficient 
industry would be made more inefficient. It was also questioned whether more 
local content would genuinely help the balance of payments situation, since the 
additional parts that would now be domestically manufactured would be ones 
requiring relatively high investments, 21 much of the machinery and technical 
assistance having to be obtained outside Mexico. Finally, it was argued that 
increased local content would cut demand by raising prices, and thus undercut 
the basic project of industrialization. The cases of Brazil and Argentina, where 
government policy required nearly 100 percent local content, and where 
automobile prices were substantially higher, were frequently cited as examples 
of the danger that lay along the road of further import substitution. 
These objections against increasing local content were held by many of 
the policy makers in the Secretary of Industry and Commerce. They were 
supported by most of the major terminal firms. 22 The terminal firms, however, 
1• On the 1969 policy, see "Compensacion de Importaciones de Partes Automovilisticas," 
Comercio Exterior (1969): 864. For the 1972 Decree, see "Decreto que Fija las Bases para el 
Desarrollo de la Industria Automotriz," Diario Oficial (24 October 1972). 
1• "Decreto Para el Fomento de la Industria Automotriz," Diario Oficial (20 June 1977): 2-7. 
20 A study done by Ford and submitted to the government showed that increasing the level of 
local content to 90 percent would raise prices 36 percent; Ford Motor Company, "Estudio Sobre 
Contenido Nacional y Generacion de Divisas por Exportaciones," mimeo, May 1976. 
21 The Ford study contended that the industry would have to invest $2.50 for every $1.00 of 
yearly savings in foreign exchange between 1980 and 1985 if increased local content were the 
option chosen, whereas if compensatory exports were chosen, that same yield in foreign exchange 
savings could be achieved with $0.60 of investment. 
22 One major firm, Fabricas AutoMex, was not opposed to increasing local content. Prior to 
1970 this firm was majority Mexican owned; the minority share was Chrysler's. In part, because of 
Chrysler's pricing policy to its majority Mexican owned subsidiary, Fabricas AutoMex had a 
difficult time competing with the 100 percent foreign owned subsidiaries of Ford and General 
Motors. In its efforts to improve its market position, Fabricas AutoMex proposed merging with 
the two other surviving Mexican owned firms (DINA and VAM). With government production 
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were not anxious to be forced into required exports either: they preferred the 
freedom to follow "market forces" to any government regulatory schemes. 
The officials in Industry and Commerce under Diaz Ordaz, however, were not 
only more outward-looking than their predecessors, but were anxious to solve 
what they saw as an important element in the increasingly serious balance of 
payments problems. In 1969 and 1972 they did urge the compensatory exports 
route. Exports seemed attractive on a number of grounds. They promised to 
cure the balance of payments problem that the industry posed without raising 
prices. They even held out the hope of lowering prices: the industry would 
have to grow more efficient in order to compete successfully on the in-
ternational market. 
The initial hesitations about looking to exports for a solution lay in 
questions of feasibility rather than desirability: how could the unwilling 
transnationals be brought to export? When the United States and Canada 
signed an agreement in 1965 making the two countries a free-trade zone in 
automotive products, the Mexican government took particular interest. 23 But a 
similar agreement between the United States and Mexico seemed impossible. 
The Canadian-U.S. agreement had required Senate ratification of a treaty. 
Lower wage rates in Mexico would surely make tougher going for a similar 
Mexican-U.S. treaty. The Canadian plan had won Senate approval only with 
the strong lobbying efforts of the U.S. automotive transnational firms, and 
these firms, having just been required to commence manufacturing in Mexico, 
were unlikely to favor exports from these plants competing with products from 
their U.S. plants. There were other problems. The newly-established Mexican 
industry, because of small-volumes and high raw material costs, was not yet 
price competitive, and there were persistent problems of quality. 
Since it seemed unlikely that the automotive firms could be encouraged to 
export voluntarily (except perhaps via massive subsidies), some degree of 
compulsion would be needed (as it would as well were higher local content to 
be chosen). The sanction most readily available was the granting or 
withholding of production quotas to the terminal firms. These production 
quotas had been instituted with the first (import substituting) auto decree of 
1962 with the express purpose of protecting the Mexican-owned (and thus 
presumably weaker) firms in the industry. 24 Limiting production via quotas 
quotas guaranteeing the new firm almost half of the market, and the economies of scale that 
would come through the merger, Fabricas AutoMex argued that increasing domestic content 
would be economically feasible and could be done with a minimal rise in consumer prices. The 
merger, however, fell through, in part because of opposition from the other companies. This 
intercorporation conflict, which enhanced the bargaining power of the Mexican government, will 
be discussed in a forthcoming paper. 
23 On this agreement, see Paul Wonnacott, "Canadian Automotive Protection: Content 
Provisions, the Bladen Plan, and Recent Tariff Changes," Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Society 31, I (February 1965): 98-115. On how the pact has fared since see, "Don't 
Shoot, They're Our Allies," Forbes (15 May 1973): 135-6; and Richard J. Fosdick, 
"U.S.-Canada Pact Re-examined," Automotive Industries (15 June 1975): 14-15. 
2• Actually there were quotas before 1962, but these served primarily to limit the total volume of 
automotive imports. 
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would ensure these Mexican firms a market. But it was also recognized that the 
quotas afforded the government a more general tool of control over the ter-
minal firms. 
Under the terms of the 1962 Decree, the terminal firms were granted basic 
quotas, but the Decree also contained a clause which allowed that firms which 
exported finished vehicles, parts, or tooling could be awarded extra quotas. 25 
Over the next several years extra quotas were granted for exports as well as for 
other special considerations. 
The 1969 Decree, however, stipulated that firms would no longer simply 
be granted their basic quotas. These would now have to be earned by com-
pensating for a steadily increasing percentage of their imports, 5 percent in 
1970, 15 percent in 1971, and so on. 26 Exports beyond these levels would still 
earn extra quotas. This scheme was consolidated and extended in the 1972 
Decree; by 1979, firms were to be compensating for 100 percent of their im-
ports with exports. Access to the domestic market was thus to be used to force 
exports. 
The compensatory exports did not have to be products of the terminal 
firms themselves; they had only to be automotive related products. 21 Indeed, 
the legislation was designed to encourage the transnational terminal firms to 
arrange exports for Mexican parts suppliers. 28 If the terminal firm arranged 
for the export of products from an automotive parts firm, the terminal firm 
would be credited for the export, for purposes of earning its basic quota. 
For the first few years of the new requirements, the terminal firms suc-
ceeded in making or arranging the necessary exports. But in 1974 and again in 
1975 the firms fell short of the mandatory levels. (See Figure 3.) Nevertheless, 
they were still granted their basic quotas, largely on the basis of promises to 
comply with export requirements in the future. How much the actual shortfall 
of exports was is a somewhat complex and contested matter which hinges on 
how the export obligations of the firms are computed. 29 What was more 
2• This clause was included in the Decree because of the urging of Ford which had already 
developed a special kind of tooling for export to other Ford plants. 
2• How were the transnational firms in the terminal industry induced to accept this new scheme? 
That is an important and difficult question, one that concerns the balance of bargaining power 
between these transnational firms and the Mexican government. We mean to analyze the origins of 
this 1969 Decree in some detail in a later publication, but it suffices here to note that competitive 
maneuvering among the firms, particularly involving Fabricas AutoMex (Chrysler) and Ford in 
which each was trying to capture an enlarged share of the market, served to enhance the 
bargaining position of the Mexican government and make possible this important shift in policy. 
27 At first, even this was not clear. One high government official told us that several of the 
terminal firms explored the idea of exporting unrelated products-one even considered exporting 
potatoes-to compensate for their imports. 
2• Since the only part the terminal industry could produce (under the 1962 Decree) was the 
motor (and this was restricted to machining), the terminal firms would have to look to the Mexican 
parts industry if it wanted to export parts other than motors. In practice, however, many were able 
to integrate into the parts industry, the most fully integrated operation being that of Volkswagen. 
2• Under the terms of the 1972 Decree, the automobile firms were required to compensate a 
certain percentage of their import bill with exports, but they could also earn an 'extra-quota' of 
cars that could be sold in Mexico for exporting automotive products. During the years of the 
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shortfall, most of the automobile firms asked for and were granted an extra-quota on the basis of 
certain exports, even though these firms had not met the export obligations for their basic quotas. 
Clearly, the export shortfall is greater if one considers the total export obligation of the firms as 
including export commitments made to gain extra-quota than if one asks only if the total exports 
of the firms compensated for the required percentage of automotive imports (leaving these ex-
tra-quota commitments out of consideration). 
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important than the precise shortfall in exports, however, was the meaning that 
the automobile firms and the government placed on this unhappy episode. 
The automobile companies immediately looked to place the blame for the 
export shortfall on certain special factors, particularly on the worldwide 
recession in the automobile industry in 1974-75 and on the overvaluation of 
the Mexican peso. Once these difficulties cleared up, they argued, export 
compensation would proceed apace. The Echeverria administration took a 
different view. These officials noticed that despite the auto export program 
there contin_ued to be a steadily growing absolute gap between the exports of 
the automobile industry and the imports of the terminal firms (see Figure 2), 
something that surely did not originate with the 1974-75 world auto market 
slump. And secondly, they were struck by the vulnerability of the auto export 
program to external conditions such as the 1974-75 world auto market slump. 
With these considerations in mind, the Echeverria administration began 
to entertain serious reservations about continuing the export compensation 
program. Many of the officials in this government charged with making 
industrial policy had served previously in the L6pez Mateos administration 
and continued to have an orientation towards an "inward-looking" in-
dustrialization strategy. In 1975-76 they drafted a new Decree governing the 
automobile industry that would have returned the basic policy orientation to 
import substitution. The Decree would have required considerably higher local 
content rather than compensatory exports as a way to spl.!r industrial growth 
and cure balance of payments troubles in the industry. The last months of the 
Echeverria administration were beset by difficulties, however: a devaluation of 
the peso in September 1976 (the first in a quarter century), and a general crisis 
of confidence, in addition to the normal troubles of a lame-duck ad-
ministration in Mexico. When the Lopez Portillo government took office in 
December 1976, it undertook a new study of the industry and a new for-
mulation of policy. The orientation of this administration was much more 
"outward looking." Its Decree of 20 June 1977 required somewhat higher 
local content, but it once again committed the Mexican government and the 
automobile firms to compensatory exports as the dominant policy strategy in 
the industry. 
The decision of the Lopez Portillo government to pursue an out-
ward-looking strategy in the automobile industry kept the industry within the 
bounds of current development orthodoxy. But the previous decade's experi-
ence with export promotion in the Mexican automobile industry points to 
a number of difficulties with export promotion strategies which have been 
commonly overlooked in recent discussions recommending such strategies, 
difficulties that spring from the power exercised by a handful of transnational 
corporations in both the Mexican terminal industry and the world automobile 
industry. We will consider a) demand rigidities for export products introduced 
by TNC domination of the world automobile industry, b) some considerations 
of decision dependency that stem from the foreign ownership of the terminal 
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firms, c) some difficulties in enforcing sanctions against TNCs under an export 
promotion policy, and d) the unequal distribution of benefit between 
foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms under such a policy. 
Transnational corporations and the political economy of export 
promotion 
Demand rigidities: transnational corporations and export possibilities 
What contribution are transnational corporations making to increasing 
exports from developing countries? A number of studies have shown that 
subsidiaries of TNCs have in fact been responsible for a disproportionately 
large share of the manufacturing exports from developing countries. A study 
of Jose de la Torre, for example, showed that "U.S. Affiliates accounted for 
only 9.5 percent of Latin America's gross manufacturing value added, 
although their share of manufacturing exports was 41.4 percent. " 30 A recent 
study by Fajnzylber and Tarrago, however, reached rather different con-
clusions for Mexico. They showed that the share of transnational corporations 
in total manufacturing production is approximately equal to their share in 
total manufacturing exports-about one third. 31 
In making sense of various data about the contributions of TNCs to 
exports from developing countries, several points need to be kept firmly in 
mind: 
First, without doubt, subsidiaries of transnational corporations are in an 
advantageous position with regard to exports. Potentially, they have access to 
market information, distributional channels, and international marketing 
skills that are not available to domestic firms. Clearly, they have the 
wherewithal, but have they the inclination? That is a largely separable con-
sideration. In answering this we need to attend to the competitive contexts and 
corporate strategies of TNCs: what factors have led them to establish 
manufacturing subsidiaries in developing countries, and how do these sub-
sidiaries fit into the firms' wider global strategies. If a subsidiary was 
established to take advantage of a readily available raw material or of cheap 
labor, then the parent firm may well be inclined to develop exports from the 
subsidiary; but if the subsidiary was established to serve the developing 
30 Jose de Ia Torre, "Foreign Investment and Export Dependency," Economic Development 
and Cultural Change 23 (1974-75): 138. 
"Fernando W. Fajnzylber, and Trinidad Martinez Tarrago, "Las Empresas Transnacionales; 
Expansi6n a Nivil Mundial y Proyecci6n en Ia lndustria Mexicana," versi6n preliminar, mimeo, 
Mexico 1975, p. 538. Their study also showed that TNCs were more likely than national firms to 
be substantial exporters-35 percent of TNCs but only 26 percent of national firms export more 
than M$500,000 per year-but that export activities were largely "irrelevant" for the over-
whelming majority of TNCs in Mexico. 72 percent of the TNCs in Mexico export less than I 
percent of their output, and 89 percent export less than 3 percent. 
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country's domestic market, particularly if the TNC entry was a defensive 
move, such exports may not be welcomed by the parent firm at all. 
Where the subsidiaries of transnational firms have the wherewithal to 
export but lack the inclination because of considerations of global corporate 
strategy, then such exports may be induced by government policies. Such 
inducements may not only require incentives to export (subsidies, tax ad-
vantages, etc.), but stronger forms of compulsion: where transnational cor-
porations are involved, export promotion may need sticks as well as carrots. 32 
Second, a very high percentage of the exports from subsidiaries of 
transnational corporations are intracompany transfers. Where this is so, 
inducing a firm to export is really better understood as a matter of inducing its 
parent firm to buy. Comparative advantage theory would focus our attention 
almost exclusively on supply-side considerations: are the products for export 
of competitive price and quality? The central role of intracompany transfers 
shifts our attention towards demand-side considerations, the factors that bear 
on the willingness of parent firms to buy manufactured goods from their own 
subsidiaries-and these factors may well go beyond price and quality. The 
structure of the international automobile industry-its domination by eight or 
so transnational firms-exhibits some demand rigidities that surely are as 
important as the supply-side factors emphasized by the new orthodoxy of 
export promotion in determining whether exports of manufactured goods may 
be possible from developing countries. 
Fully assembled vehicles constitute a steadily diminishing share of total 
world automotive trade as the transnational firms establish assembly or 
manufacturing plants abroad, often in response to government policies 
requiring domestic manufacture. In those markets where export sales of 
finished vehicles are still possible (for example in the smaller countries of 
Central America) transnational firms are most unlikely to allow their various 
subsidiaries to compete with one another or with the main plant in the home 
country. The decision as to which plant to permit to supply the market will 
depend on complex considerations based on the global rationality of the 
transnational firm-where the greatest opportunities for profit are to be 
found. This depends only in part on the costs of production of each sub-
sidiary. Transportation costs and comparative tax burdens are also important, 
and the major automobile firms have sought to maintain production volumes 
32 It follows that if government policies have (and have had) a strong hand in influencing 
whether transnational corporations will export manufactured goods from developing countries, 
then it does not make sense to ask in a general sort of way what contribution transnational cor-
porations make to increasing exports from developing countries. Asking the question in this 
manner ascribes responsibility solely to the TNCs. Instead, we need to ask to what extent can 
different kinds of government policies in different manufacturing sectors be effective in inducing 
TN Cs to export. This would argue as well against a procedure such as Boatler's in which he tries to 
explain the unexpectedly high capital intensity of Mexico's manufactured exports, but begins by 
ruling out of consideration explanations that turn on government policy ("Trade Theory 
Predictions and the Growth of Mexico's Manufactured Exports," Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 23 (1974-75): 492, note 3). 
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Percentage of Exports Which Are 
Total Parts Made Parts Made 
Value of Assembled by Firm by Auto-
Firm Exports* Vehicles Itself Parts Firms 
Chrysler 708,401 3.6 75.8 20.6 
DINA (Renault) 133,071 24.8 1.5 73.6 
Ford 542,705 0.7 26.8 72.4 
G.M. 344,649 0.0 45.9 54.1 
Nissan (Datsun) 101,573 37.8 41.4 20.8 
VAMSA (A.M.C.) 128,790 0.0 0.2 99.8 
Volkswagen 617,691 11.5 88.5 0.0 
TOTAL 2,576,880 6.6 55.6 37.8 
* In OOOs of pesos. 
Source: Secretary of Industry and Commerce 
in their home country plants because of the high scale economies and sub-
stantial fixed-capital costs in these locations, and because of the importance of 
maintaining relationships with their regular parts suppliers. Exports of 
finished vehicles accounted for only 6.6 percent of Mexican automotive ex-
ports (see Table 2). It is noteworthy that the three firms that were the largest 
exporters of assembled vehicles from Mexico (Volkswagen, Nissan, and 
DINA-Renault) were those without major assembly plants in the United States 
and that a high proportion of these exports were destined for Central and 
South America. As more countries insist upon local manufacture or assembly 
of vehicles sold in the domestic market, government policy is likely to prove 
less efficacious in increasing exports of assembled vehicles. Export possibilities 
are more likely to be found in automotive parts-for original equipment or for 
replacement. 
Some parts for new cars are produced by the automobile firms themselves 
(e.g. body stampings, motors), and others are regularly purchased from parts 
suppliers. Decisions by the automobile firms about where to produce their own 
parts (in which plant or subsidiary in the world) where not stipulated by 
government policy are based on calculations involving considerations of 
quality, reliability of supply, and cost of production. Since these sales of parts 
are intracompany transfers, howeYer, pricing can be arranged to take ad-
vantage of tax schedules in different countries (availability of subsidies and 
credits for investment, for exports, etc.) or to accord with a variety of other 
considerations of global strategy. Since prices of export parts are open to a 
substantial degree of manipulation, simply being capable of manufacturing 
parts at competitive costs might not be sufficient to win Mexico a share of this 
kind of world trade. 
Where parts are procured from independent suppliers, transfer pricing is 
less of a concern; but procurement decisions here are similarly conditioned by 
factors other than cost and quality. The major auto manufacturers have 
long-term relationships with many of their important parts suppliers which 
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they are particularly eager to maintain, and which might lead them to be 
hesitant to accept imports from Mexican parts firms. 33 There is a vicious circle 
to be noted here as well. For many parts, the size of the Mexican market means 
that a parts manufacturer cannot produce at a price that would be competitive 
for export, but it may only be through such exports that the costs can be 
reduced to competitive levels. The Mexican manufacturer, however, will not 
make the investments for enlarged, more efficient production without the 
assurance of the export market, particularly because for a great many of these 
parts-in view of the product differentiation in the industry-there is only one 
potential buyer. One can hardly speak of a world market. 
Finally, there is the "after market"-replacement parts. This is a more 
open market than those for assembled vehicles or original equipment parts, 
but there are significant TNC-induced rigidities here as well. A large number 
of buyers are to be found in the after market-garages, repair shops, dealers, 
auto supply stores, etc.-in addition to the transnational auto firms. For some 
parts involving simple technology which have broad suitability across makes, 
models, and years such as wheel rims, windshields, shock absorbers and the 
like, competitive price and quality may be sufficient to capture a share of the 
market. But for parts which embody sophisticated technology or which must 
meet the product design specifications of a particular make or model, export 
sales will be possible only if the auto manufacturer (or its parts supplier) is 
willing to license the necessary technology or designs. For various reasons, 
such licenses may not be available. 34 
Although there may be more export opportunities in this third market, the 
general point still holds, that export possibilities are largely controlled by the 
transnational automobile firms (and their major parts suppliers) to fit the 
requirements of their global strategies. Promoting auto exports from Mexico 
would seem to require two kinds of action: action to lower the costs of parts 
that have export potential, and action to find ways to induce the transnational 
auto firms to buy the parts. It is important to bear in mind that achieving the 
first does not necessarily entail achieving the second. The Mexican government 
appreciated this point in 1969 when it first began actively to promote auto 
exports. It did not look to use subsidies or other fiscal incentives to achieve the 
goal-policies which would have attacked primarily the supply side of the 
problem. Instead, the policy selected was one that attacked the demand side, 
33 Of course many of the Mexican parts firms are subsidiaries of U.S. auto parts firms, having 
been brought into Mexico with the encouragement of the major auto firms when manufacturing 
operations commenced in the early 1960s. When this is the case, the auto firms may arrange with 
their parts suppliers to import parts from these suppliers' subsidiaries in Mexico. Here again, how-
ever, transfer pricing arrangements intrude; and procurement decisions are based on more than 
considerations of cost and quality. 
34 There are some examples in Mexico of export manufacture of such parts for the after market. 
A Monterrey firm makes replacement body stampings for Mercury Cougars for export to the 
United States, but only because it has been allowed to obtain the necessary stamping dies. Volks-
wagen de Mexico supplies replacement fender and hood stampings for its 'Beetle' to the U.S. after 
market, a decision that was rational within the firm's global operations with the phase out of that 
model in the United States. and with the stamping presses and dies close at hand in Mexico. 
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inducing the transnational auto firms to buy automotive exports from Mexico 
by making their subsidiaries' continued participation in the Mexican market 
contingent on the success of such exports. If the exports were not forthcoming, 
production quotas for the domestic Mexican market would be cut. When the 
terminal firms did not fully comply with their export commitments in 1974 and 
1975, however, their production quotas were not cut. Why the commitments 
were not met, and why the production quotas were not cut are questions that 
lead to two further points, one concerning decision dependency-that 
automotive export decisions are made outside of Mexico in Detroit, Wolfs-
burg, Paris, and Tokyo-and the other concerning some difficulties in the use 
of sanctions. 
Decision dependency 
The TNC subsidiaries had agreed (with a green light from their respective 
parents) to arrange exports of automotive products. But if such exports were 
to continue year after year, the parent firm would have to agree to buy the 
exports in each new year. What had been convenient in 1969, however, might 
not be convenient, in view of other global considerations, a few years hence. 
Reliance on exports to solve the balance of payments problem made Mexico 
dependent on the decisions of powerful transnational corporations for whom 
Mexico was only one manufacturing operation among many. The alternative 
of increased local content would not have had this effect. By decreasing the au-
tonomy of the subsidiary, such a strategy might even have increased the 
autonomy of the subsidiary and made it more susceptible to being steered in 
accordance with national policy planning goals. Within the export promotion 
route, the Mexican government would need very strong leverage in order to 
compel the parent firm to alter its strategy, to buy Mexican exports, when this 
ceased to accord with the requisites of global rationality. Did Mexico ever have 
sanctions powerful enough that it could affect the decisions in Detroit? 
Before considering the possibilities of effective sanctions, a second way in 
which the export promotion route increased Mexico's dependency on foreign 
decision centers should be examined. If exports were to be possible, Mexico 
would have to manufacture parts that conformed to the requirements of cars 
made elsewhere in the world; they would have to fit the models and makes 
produced for the major automobile markets. Consequently, a series of policies 
for rationalizing production within Mexico would become difficult or im-
possible to implement-policies such as the use of standardized parts or the 
mandatory freezing of model years. The policies designed to make car 
production more suitable for the conditions of the Mexican market might 
make Mexican automotive parts unsuitable for export. Decisions about 
product design, then, would necessarily be made outside Mexico, in answer to 
market conditions different from those within Mexico. 
It is worth adding that the market structure resulting from export 
promotion would also increase the leverage of the TNCs in bargaining with the 
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government over such issues as the percentage of local content (the TNCs 
could argue that increases might force price rises and "prevent" them from 
exporting) and vertical integration (the TNCs could insist on being allowed 
more vertical integration-at the cost of the Mexican supplier industry-on 
the argument that only they could meet the requisites of cost, quality, and 
delivery needed for export). 
Enforcement difficulties 
The sanction of reducing production quotas for failing to comply with 
export requirements may have been a powerful enough weapon to induce 
compliance, had the government been willing to use it, but it was a sword 
whose sharpness cut both ways, and which thus could not be unsheathed-for 
fear of injuring the country more seriously than the firms. If production 
quotas were decreased, the terminal firms would no doubt be hurt in several 
ways. Sales would decrease. Unit costs of production would increase, given the 
scale economies, thus cutting the profit margin on the units that could be sold 
under the smaller quota. Sales of parts from the parent to the subsidiary would 
decrease, thus decreasing earnings for the parent obtained through such sales. 
But the harm to the country would be yet more varied. Decreased production 
would mean fewer jobs in the terminal firms for Mexican workers. Fewer parts 
would be bought from the supplier firms; their sales would decrease, their 
profits as well, and more workers would be laid off. Automobile manufacture 
was desired in Mexico because of the manifold consequences it would have in 
stimulating other industries. Should quotas be decreased, those backward and 
forward linkages would transmit production cutbacks in terminal firms 
throughout the industrial structure of Mexico. 35 
Sanctions of another sort might be possible-monetary fines or tax 
penalties, for example-that would not be so sharply double-edged, which 
would penalize the earnings of the terminal firms without leading to a decrease 
in their levels of production. It is worth pointing out that enforcement dif-
ficulties would not be so severe with a requirement of increased local content. 
There would be less dependence on decisions taken outside of Mexico, and 
import permits would be used to insure that the required level of local content 
was being incorporated by each terminal firm. Production sanctions would be 
unnecessary. 
35 The sanction of quota reductions could be used if only one or two of the terminal firms failed 
to meet their export commitments. The quotas of the other firms could be correspondingly in-
creased and aggregate levels of production, employment, parts purchases, etc. would be main-
tained. Given the character of the world automobile industry, it is likely that a short-fall in exports 
by one firm would be matched by all, as occurred in Mexico in 1974-75 (unless one of the smaller 
firms in the world industry-American Motors, for example-began to lose its competitive viabil-
ity). And it is also important to note that while aggregate production might be maintained, there 
would be distributional consequences, and not just for the terminal firm involved (i.e. for work-
ers, parts suppliers, etc.) See the next section. 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 15:01:53 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
The case of the Mexican automobile industry 197 
One other enforcement consideration concerns the possibility of coun-
ter-measures from the developed countries. A policy that requires the TNCs to 
import into their home countries is surely more likely to provoke protectionist 
reprisals from the home country governments of the TNCs than a policy that 
requires these firms to export less from their home countries. 36 
The distribution of benefits 
One last drawback of a policy requiring exports as opposed to requiring 
increased local content warrants mention. If one is only considering the 
aggregate effects of the two alternatives-the total effect on the balance of 
payments or on the gross domestic product, for example, requiring exports is 
not a drawback. But suppose we inquire not of the aggregate effects but of the 
distribution of benefits: who benefits from requiring exports and who from 
requiring increased local content? 
A policy of requiring exports has worked to the disadvantage of the 
terminal firms which are not wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries of trans-
national firms. We have argued that inducing the terminal firms to export 
means inducing their transnational parents to buy. But where a terminal firm 
is linked to a transnational auto firm only through a license or a minority 
equity holding, this is difficult. The sanctions available to the Mexican 
government (granting or withholding production quotas for the Mexican 
market) are much less efficacious. Consequently, the two firms that are 
majority Mexican owned, DINA and V AMSA, have the poorest export 
records. The government can at its discretion overlook these poor export 
records and has, but only at the cost of making these firms appear to need 
continued government favoritism to stay in business. 37 In addition, the im-
position of the export requirements in 1969 was the proximate cause of the 
denationalization of the Chrysler subsidiary. Before that year, the majority of 
Fabricas AutoMex (as the firm was then called) was owned by the Azcarraga 
family. When the export requirements were introduced, however, Chrysler 
was not willing to commit itself to purchases of such exports from Mexico 
unless it directly controlled the subsidiary. In 1970 Chrysler purchased nearly 
all of the Mexican-held stock. While the export requirements were not the sole 
determinant, they were a major contributing factor. 
When we turn our attention from the terminal firms to the parts supplier 
firms, equally striking distributional consequences are to be noted. A very few 
36 Fred Bergsten has suggested that any such 'performance requirements' placed by LDCs on 
TNCs may provoke such reprisals. "Coming Investment Wars?" Foreign Affairs (October 1974): 
135-52. While the economic consequences may be roughly equivalent-lost jobs, etc.-the greater 
visibility of a policy that requires the home country to accept imports of products it once made for 
itself would make more likely the political reaction that could provoke the counter-measures. 
37 Moreover, the diadvantaging of these firms through export requirements decreases the possi-
bility of using these two government-owned firms as instruments to regulate the wholly foreign 
owned firms. 
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Table 3: 1975 exports from automotive parts firms 
Percentage of 
Total 1975 Total Exports 
Foreign Participation Exports (in from Auto 
Firm in Equity Mexican Pesos) Parts Firms 
I. Transmisiones y Equipos (Clark Equipment Co.) 
Mecanicos (TREMEC) Yes (34 Percent) 405,934,529 41.7 
2. Equipo Automotriz 
Americana Yes(?) 149,079,048 15.3 
3. Rassini Rheem (Rheem International) 
Yes (40 Percent) 127,984,629 13.2 
4. Whitaker (Whitaker Inter-America) 
Yes(?) 25,296,050 2.6 
5. Aralmex Yes(?) 24,911,289 2.6 
6. Industria Automotriz No 21,948,193 2.3 
7. Manufacturas Metalica (A. 0. Smith) 
Monterrey Yes (40 Percent) 20,744,295 2.1 
8. F.U.M.E. (?) 18,037,490 1.9 
9. Automanufacturas (Budd Corp.) 
Yes(?) 16,093,927 1.7 
10. Mex-Par Blackstone (Blackstone) 
Yes(?) 10,917,522 I.I 
Total of Top Ten Exporting 
Auto Parts Firms 820,946,972 84.4 
Total Exports from All 
Auto Parts Firms 973,142,915 100 
Source: Secretary of Industry and Commerce 
parts firms now account for the large majority of auto parts exports from 
Mexico. In 1975, forty (of several hundred)38 auto parts firms had some ex-
ports but one firm accounted for 42 percent of these, and ten firms accounted 
for over 80 percent (see Table 3). 
It is likely that a determined policy of export promotion would generate 
additional sales for only these and a very few others. The majority of parts 
firms would not benefit. 
An additional dose of import substitution-increasing the level of local 
content-would tend towards an opposite pattern of benefit. A few firms 
would be unaffected-those that are already supplying as many of the ter-
minal firms as is possible. But new sales would be generated for a large number 
of firms who manufacture more or less standardized parts that are bought by 
only one or two of the terminal firms. At an increased level of required local 
content, other terminal firms would leave off importing these parts in favor of 
purchasing domestically manufactured items. 
38 According to Business Trends, a Mexican business annual, the auxiliary industry in 1975 
consisted of "560 plants (about 280 of which produce only automotive industry equipment)", 
Business Trends (1975): 215. 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 15:01:53 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
The case of the Mexican automobile industry 199 
A second point: the parts firms that succeed in exporting are 
disproportionately those with strong foreign equity participation. 39 Thus, 
requiring exports tends to work against the goal of promoting Mexican in-
vestment. Data on ownership are difficult to obtain in Mexico, but at least six 
and probably eight or nine of the ten top auto parts exporting firms have 
strong foreign equity participation, and surely only a small percentage of the 
several hundred auto parts firms in Mexico have any degree of foreign 
ownership. According to one study, only 39 of 410 firms in the auto parts 
industry were subsidiaries of TN Cs. 40 One reason for the exporting success of 
the firms with foreign equity is the technical sophistication of these joint 
ventures-their products are more competitive in terms of price and quality. 
There is another and equally strong reason, however: the international 
automobile firms, having long-standing relationships with major parts 
manufacturers, prefer to buy from the subsidiaries of these parts manufac-
turers rather than from independent Mexican firms. 
A third point is related. If exports are required, and if these exports are to 
be predominately auto parts rather than finished vehicles, then the terminal 
firms are sure to argue that extant restrictions on vertical integration should be 
lifted to allow the terminal firms to manufacture the parts that are to be ex-
ported, on the argument that only their control over the manufacture of these 
parts can ensure the necessary high quality, competitive cost, and timely 
delivery. To a small degree these arguments have already succeeded. Chrysler 
is now manufacturing and exporting condensers for air conditioners, and Ford 
is constructing a plant to manufacture hubs and drums, largely for export. 
Even if the restrictions on vertical integration remain, however, the terminal 
firms can themselves manufacture for export those parts which they are 
already permitted to manufacture (motors, for example). In such ways, export 
promotion will have worked against the goal of promoting Mexican in-
vestment. 
Conclusions 
Export promotion and import substitution are often characterized as 
exclusive alternatives, 41 but they need not be so viewed. Once we recognize that 
import substitution laid the foundation for an industry that could become a 
39 By law, all auto parts firms must be at least majority Mexican owned (wholly foreign-owned 
subsidiaries are not allowed). 
4° Fernando Fajnzylber and Trinidad Martinez Tarrago, "Las Empresas Transnacionales: Ex-
pansi6n a Nivel Mundial y Proyecci6n en la lndustria Mexicana." 
4 ' See, for example, Little, Scitovsky, and Scott, p. 1 I. Product cycle theory as developed by 
Raymond Vernon and his associates, of course, depicts these as integrated parts of the same 
process. See, for example, Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of 
U.S. Enterprises (New York: Basic Books, 1971); and Louis T. Wells, Jr., ed., The Product Life 
Cycle and International Trade (Boston: Harvard University, Division of Research, Graduate 
School of Business Administration, 1972). 
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candidate for export promotion, another possibility emerges: ways might be 
found by which further doses of import substitution might facilitate a greater 
volume of manufactured exports, while lessening the necessity of depending 
upon these exports. So long as the Mexican automobile industry was merely a 
CKD operation, assembling automobiles from imported kits, no exports were 
possible. Local content requirements created the manufacturing basis of the 
current industry. Motors, transmissions, springs, wheels and hubs-nearly all 
the principal automotive parts exports-first came to be manufactured in 
Mexico in significant volumes as a result of import substitution policies. 42 Are 
there particular areas in which still further import substitution might actually 
encourage exports? 
It is usually argued that there are not: a requirement of increased local 
content would raise automobile prices and thus make exports still more dif-
ficult. While it is likely to be the case that the price of assembled automobiles 
would increase, there is no reason to suppose that the prices of component 
parts already being manufactured would increase-and these will continue to 
constitute the bulk of auto industry exports. Further, a study made by one of 
the principal associations of automotive parts manufacturers showed that 
there were many parts which some terminal firms were procuring in Mexico 
but which other terminal firms were continuing to import. 43 Higher local 
content requirements could compel all the terminal firms to procure these 
parts domestically, at no substantial increase in price; and the resulting greater 
domestic volume of production might well lower prices on these parts, perhaps 
even to the point of making their export more feasible. 
As a general development strategy, import substitution industrialization 
proved to engender certain recurring and fundamental problems, principally 
the creation of an inefficient industrial structure and chronic balance of 
payments difficulties. In the wake of this experience, export promotion came 
to be championed as an alternative development strategy that could cure these 
troubles. The argument here, however, had been that, when employed in sec-
tors dominated by subsidiaries of transnational corporations, an export 
promotion strategy may run afoul of difficulties of its own. These problems 
are not immediately apparent from the neo-classical, comparative-advantage 
perspective that has provided its principal theoretical support. 
Where a manufacturing sector has been created through import sub-
stitution, the question is not so much whether or not to promote exports, but 
42 There are, of course, exceptions. Some auto parts manufacturing has been initiated primar-
ily for export. Chrysler, for example, has begun manufacturing condensers for automobile 
air-conditioners for export. This kind of manufacture-for-export is almost strictly confined, 
however, to the parts manufactured by the terminal firms themselves. The general point holds for 
the supplier firms. 
43 The study was one submitted to the Ministry of Patrimony and Industrial Promotion in 
March 1977 by the Auto Parts section of the National Chamber of Manufacturing Industries. The 
organization's estimate was that the terminal firms could increase their purchases from auto parts 
firms (substituting for imports) by 27 percent without any new investments by the auto parts firms, 
and by an additional 21 percent with minimal new investments. 
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whether or not to switch horses in midstream. If a particular industrial 
structure has been created under the influence of government policy and is 
dominated by transnational corporations following their global strategies (i.e. 
governed by considerations that transcend local conditions and government 
policy), then is the promotion of exports a possible and desirable policy? Such 
has been the question in the Mexican automobile industry. Given the 
ownership and structural characteristics of the international and Mexican 
automobile industry, the Mexican government's attempt to shift to export 
promotion in 1969 has brought certain difficult problems. The experience has 
shown that such a policy may be difficult to carry through a) because of 
demand rigidities for products in which there are substantial intracompany 
transfers, b) because of the decision dependency that is introduced by having 
to rely on decisions made in the TNCs' home countries, and c) because of 
certain difficulties in enforcing such a policy should it encounter recalcitrance. 
Such a policy may also be undesirable, even if it can be carried through, 
because of the resultant decision dependency and because of d) the unequal 
distribution of benefits it may produce between foreign-owned and 
domestically-owned firms. 
Consideration of the desirability of export promotion policies must move 
beyond a general analysis of exchange rates, tariffs, and tax policies, and 
attend to the structure, history, and dynamics of specific candidate 
manufacturing sectors, both in the country in question and internationally. 
